نتائج البحث

Executive Compensation and the Misplaced Emphasis on Increasing Shareholder Access to the Proxy

• Authors : Marino, Lori B.

• Source: University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 1999 May 01. 147(5), 1205-1249.

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PAYING FOR LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE.

• Authors : Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Fried, Jesse M.

• Source: University of Pennsylvania Law Review. Jun2010, Vol. 158 Issue 7, p1915-1959. 45p.

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PAYING FOR PERFORMANCE IN BANKRUPTCY: WHY CEOS SHOULD BE COMPENSATED WITH DEBT.

• Authors : Listokin, Yair

• Source: University of Pennsylvania Law Review. Apr2007, Vol. 155 Issue 4, p777-832. 56p.

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PUZZLING STOCK OPTIONS AND COMPENSATION NORMS.

• Authors : Levmore, Saul

• Source: University of Pennsylvania Law Review. Jun2001, Vol. 149 Issue 6, p1901. 40p.

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Executive Compensation and the Misplaced Emphasis on Increasing Shareholder Access to the Proxy

• Authors : Lori B. Marino

Subjects: Actuarial science; Executive compensation; Shareholder

• Source: University of Pennsylvania Law Review. 147:1205

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The Limited Significance of Norms for Corporate Governance

• Authors : Kahan, Marcel

• Source: University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 2001 Jun 01. 149(6), 1869-1900.

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Tax Constraints on Indexed Options

• Authors : Schizer, David M.

• Source: University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 2001 Jun 01. 149(6), 1941-1953.

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The Limited Significance of Norms for Corporate Governance

• Authors : Marcel Kahan

Subjects: Structure (mathematical logic); Value (ethics); Executive compensation

• Source: University of Pennsylvania Law Review. 149:1869

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CREDITORS' BALL: THE "NEW" NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHAPTER 11.

• Authors : Skeel Jr., David A.¹

• Source: University of Pennsylvania Law Review. Dec2003, Vol. 152 Issue 2, p917-951. 35p.

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