Severity as a moral qualifier of malady

Linköpings universitet, Avdelningen för samhälle och hälsa Linköpings universitet, Medicinska fakulteten Univ Oslo, Norway; Akershus Univ Hosp HF, Norway Akershus Univ Hosp HF, Norway Univ Oslo, Norway; Norwegian Univ Sci & Technol, Norway BMC 2023

Solberg, Carl Tollef
Barra, Mathias
Sandman, Lars
Hoffmann, Bjorn

The overarching aim of this article is to scrutinize how severity can work as a qualifier for the moral impetus of malady. While there is agreement that malady is of negative value, there is disagreement about precisely how this is so. Nevertheless, alleviating disease, injury, and associated suffering is almost universally considered good. Furthermore, the strength of a diseased persons moral claims for our attention and efforts will inevitably vary. This article starts by reflecting on what kind of moral impetus malady incites. We then analyze how severity may qualify this impetus. We do so by discussing the relationship between severity and need, well-being and disvalue, death, urgency, rule of rescue, and distributive justice. We then summarize our thoughts about severity as a moral qualifier. We conclude that severity is, and should continue to be seen, as a morally significant concept that deserves continued attention in the future.

Decision making; Medical humanities; Philosophy; Rationing; resource allocation; Philosophy; Filosofi; Article in journal; info:eu-repo/semantics/article; text

10.1186.s12910-023-00903-2

application/pdf
English

UPE oai:DiVA.org:liu-193428
0000-0003-0987-7653
doi:10.1186/s12910-023-00903-2
PMID 37004054
ISI:000960775600001
1400060873

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