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Preventing Under-Reporting in Social Task Allocation

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اقرأ أكثر حفظ في قائمتي

المؤلفون: De Weerdt, M.M. (author); Zhang, Y. (author)
نوع التسجيلة:
Electronic Resource
الدخول الالكتروني :
http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:39fcae97-c6fb-4fbb-b06a-2dbb63f03a22
Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing, 44, 2010; authors version
doi:doi:10.1007/978-3-642-15237-5_1

معلومة اضافية
- Publisher Information:
  Springer 2010-12-31
- نبذة مختصرة :
  In games where agents are asked to declare their available resources, they can also strategize over this declaration. Surprisingly, not in all such games a VCG payment can be applied to construct a truthful mechanism using an optimal algorithm, though such payments can prevent under-reporting of resources. We show this for the problem of allocating tasks in a social network (STAP). Since STAP is NP-hard, we introduce an approximation algorithm as well. However for such an approximation, a VCG payment cannot prevent under-reporting anymore. Therefore we introduce an alternative payment function that motivates agents to fully declare their resources. We also demonstrate by experiments that the approximation algorithm works well in different types of social networks.
  Software Computer Technology
  Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science
- الموضوع:
  book chapter; Text
- Availability:
  Open access content. Open access content
  (c) 2010 Springer
  The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
- Note:
  English
- Other Numbers:
  NLTUD oai:tudelft.nl:uuid:39fcae97-c6fb-4fbb-b06a-2dbb63f03a22
  1008799899
- Contributing Source:
  DELFT UNIV OF TECHNOL
  From OAIster®, provided by the OCLC Cooperative.
- الرقم المعرف:
  edsoai.on1008799899

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