نبذة مختصرة : Introduction This paper presents the results of laboratory experiments on trust and cooperation in social interactions. It aims at contributing to one of the basic questions of theoretical sociology: social order. In order to maintain social order, a collectivist orientation is essential for any society (Javadi Yeganeh and Hashemi, 2006). The formation of collective actions through individual actions and interpersonal interactions, and why and how cooperation between actors have different answers in sociological paradigms (Asgharpour, 2011). Therefore, explaining social order has been the main concern of most social scientists. Albeit economists and sociologists have their specific approaches to this issue. In the economic view, actors are rational creatures who try to maximize their individual profits. They investigate available resources and choices, and check the potential consequences, then adopt the decision that has the most benefit for them. In the sociological approach, agents are affected by social norms and values, and give the first priority to collective interests. Hence they make decisions in harmony with social norms and help to gain social benefits. The best way to explain actions with regard to both individual preferences and social forces is the advertent observation of actors’ decision making in various social situations. The purpose of this paper is to study the relationship between trust and cooperation in social interactions using laboratory experiments. This matter is important because trust is vital in all interactions including business transactions, and many scholars have emphasized the importance of this issue. Materials & Methods This experiment took place over one days in the computer laboratory of the literature Faculty of Ferdowsi University, using the experimental software z-Tree. The participants were 28 students recruited through public announcement in various faculties. All interactions took place through the computer network and the subjects were unable to identify their counterparts. The subjects played 30 periods in all and were informed in advance of the duration of the game. The game took nearly one hour (including instructions) and the average payment was 42000 Rials, which was paid immediately after the experiment. Each game was conducted with two subjects, and in each period subjects are randomly assigned to the role of A and B; (ii) both player A (the investor) and player B (the trustee) received an initial endowment of 10 experimental currency units (ECU), having an exchange rate of 1 ECU = 1.5 Euro cents; (iii) player A decided his/her investment and the invested amount was tripled and sent to player B in addition to his/her own endowment; (iv) B chose the amount to return to A; (v) the sums earned by both players in the current period were shown to both subjects. Discussion of Results & Conclusions In this baseline game, the subgame perfect equilibrium, assuming that actors are rational and self-interested, is for B to return nothing and consequently for A to keep all his/her endowment. Nevertheless, experimental evidence shows that investors are willing to send on average about 40-50% of their endowment, while trustees return slightly more than the amount sent (Berg et al., 1995; see also Camerer, 2003). The pure economic perspective to expect that actors are economic and simply tend to look for more profit, should lead to the fact that the parties do not trust their interactions. However, the results of this study showed that actors significantly trusted their interactions and investors were willing to send on average about 23% of their endowment. Also, even B players (trustees) who must pay a part of their profit to trustors, did not act in pure economic terms. Also, there was not a significant difference between men and women in the amount of investment.
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