The Phenomenological Concept of Husserl's Theory of Intentionality

The purpose of this article is to examine the metaphysical and ontological problems concerning the intentionality of acts of consciousness, the status of the objects toward which intentional phenomena are directed, and the characterization of the intentional relations. According to Husserl, an act is just what might be called experiential component of an intentional event, purified of presumptions concerning its interlacing with nature. With respect to the objects of acts, Husserl maintains that there are as many kinds of objects of acts as there are kinds of entities, which means, that not all acts intend objects of the same sort. We have tried to elaborate that Husserl takes the intentionality of an act to be a phenomenological features that the act has solely in virtue of its internal structure, or as Husserl sometimes says its intentional content or "Noeama".