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Efficient electro-magnetic analysis of a GPU bitsliced AES implementation

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  • معلومة اضافية
    • بيانات النشر:
      SpringerOpen, 2020.
    • الموضوع:
      2020
    • Collection:
      LCC:Computer engineering. Computer hardware
      LCC:Electronic computers. Computer science
    • نبذة مختصرة :
      Abstract The advent of CUDA-enabled GPU makes it possible to provide cloud applications with high-performance data security services. Unfortunately, recent studies have shown that GPU-based applications are also susceptible to side-channel attacks. These published work studied the side-channel vulnerabilities of GPU-based AES implementations by taking the advantage of the cache sharing among multiple threads or high parallelism of GPUs. Therefore, for GPU-based bitsliced cryptographic implementations, which are immune to the cache-based attacks referred to above, only a power analysis method based on the high-parallelism of GPUs may be effective. However, the leakage model used in the power analysis is not efficient at all in practice. In light of this, we investigate electro-magnetic (EM) side-channel vulnerabilities of a GPU-based bitsliced AES implementation from the perspective of bit-level parallelism and thread-level parallelism in order to make the best of the localization effect of EM leakage with parallelism. Specifically, we propose efficient multi-bit and multi-thread combinational analysis techniques based on the intrinsic properties of bitsliced ciphers and the effect of multi-thread parallelism of GPUs, respectively. The experimental result shows that the proposed combinational analysis methods perform better than non-combinational and intuitive ones. Our research suggests that multi-thread leakages can be used to improve attacks if the multi-thread leakages are not synchronous in the time domain.
    • File Description:
      electronic resource
    • ISSN:
      2523-3246
    • Relation:
      http://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s42400-020-0045-8; https://doaj.org/toc/2523-3246
    • الرقم المعرف:
      10.1186/s42400-020-0045-8
    • الرقم المعرف:
      edsdoj.440f7829e44a4bd58c1d3ae31abde0cf