نبذة مختصرة : We propose a new sheaf semantics for secure information flow over a space of abstract behaviors, based on synthetic domain theory: security classes are open/closed partitions, types are sheaves, and redaction of sensitive information corresponds to restricting a sheaf to a closed subspace. Our security-aware computational model satisfies termination-insensitive noninterference automatically, and therefore constitutes an intrinsic alternative to state of the art extrinsic/relational models of noninterference. Our semantics is the latest application of Sterling and Harper’s recent reinterpretation of phase distinctions and noninterference in programming languages in terms of Artin gluing and topos-theoretic open/closed modalities. Prior applications include parametricity for ML modules, the proof of normalization for cubical type theory by Sterling and Angiuli, and the cost-aware logical framework of Niu et al. In this paper we employ the phase distinction perspective twice: first to reconstruct the syntax and semantics of secure information flow as a lattice of phase distinctions between “higher” and “lower” security, and second to verify the computational adequacy of our sheaf semantics with respect to a version of Abadi et al.’s dependency core calculus to which we have added a construct for declassifying termination channels.
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