Uncovering the process of inter-firm cooperation: an interaction dynamics approach. ; CUHK electronic theses & dissertations collection ; ProQuest dissertations and theses

An interaction dynamics perspective conceives the cooperation process as an action chain consisting of the actions and reactions between cooperating partners when they respond to disruptive events. The action chain is characterized by three constructs: action acquiescence, action simplicity, and action reciprocity. I further develop an action pattern model that clarifies the relationships among partner relation, governance structure, action pattern, and cooperation performance in a partnership. ; Extant literature in strategic alliance has inconsistent conclusions on why some cases of cooperation succeed but some fail. I argue that the interaction process in cooperation may be the missing piece in the puzzle. Drawing on an interaction dynamics perspective, this dissertation examines what factors affect the interaction process and how variations of the interaction process affect cooperation performance. ; In the second study, a questionnaire survey was conducted and a sample of 263 construction projects was obtained. The regression analysis indicated that partner relation affected action pattern, and this effect was moderated by governance structure. Contrary to conventional belief that action pattern mediates the effect of partner relation on cooperation performance, I found that action pattern and partner relation affected cooperation performance independently. ; The action pattern model was empirically tested in the dyadic partnership between architects and contractors in two related studies. In the first study, qualitative data from 12 construction partnerships were collected through semi-structured interviews, questionnaires, and documents between architects and contractors. Overall, the case studies provided some "thick descriptions" of the action repertoire in cooperation. Results showed that cooperating partners adopted particular actions as deliberate strategic signaling to each other and as a means of reward/punishment. Moreover, actions tended to stabilize after repeated interaction cycles as ...