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Externalities and the (Pre)nucleolus in Cooperative Games

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اقرأ أكثر حفظ في قائمتي
  • معلومة اضافية
    • بيانات النشر:
      Elsevier B.V.
    • الموضوع:
      2024
    • Collection:
      Dipòsit Digital de la Universitat de Barcelona
    • نبذة مختصرة :
      In most economic applications of cooperative games, externalities prevail: the worth of a coalition depends on how the other players are organized. We show that there is a unique natural way of extending the prenucleolus to games with coalitional externalities. This is in contrast to the Shapley value and the core for which many different extensions have been proposed.
    • File Description:
      6 p.; application/pdf
    • ISSN:
      0165-4896
    • Relation:
      Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.003; Mathematical Social Sciences, 2024, vol. 128, num.March, p. 10-15; https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.003; http://hdl.handle.net/2445/207069; 741726
    • Rights:
      cc-by (c) Elsevier B.V., 2024 ; http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/ ; info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
    • الرقم المعرف:
      edsbas.CA9681F2