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Quantum position verification:Loss-tolerant protocols and fundamental limits

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  • المؤلفون: Verduyn Lunel, P.H.
  • المصدر:
    Verduyn Lunel , P H 2024 , ' Quantum position verification : Loss-tolerant protocols and fundamental limits ' , Doctor of Philosophy , Universiteit van Amsterdam .
  • نوع التسجيلة:
    book
  • اللغة:
    English
  • معلومة اضافية
    • الموضوع:
      2024
    • Collection:
      Universiteit van Amsterdam: Digital Academic Repository (UvA DARE)
    • نبذة مختصرة :
      In this thesis we explore position-based quantum cryptography zooming in on the task of position verification. In position verification, the idea is to use an individual's geographical location as a cryptographic credential. In practice, such protocols can authenticate that a message originated from a specific location or ensure that messages can only be read at a certain location. In a position-verification protocol, the limitations imposed by the speed of light, as described by special relativity, are used to verify that a party is at their claimed location. It has been shown that any QPV protocol can be broken by attackers that use an amount of entanglement exponential in the input size. However, from a practical point of view, not all is lost. We can still hope for QPV protocols that are secure in practice. This raises the problem of designing protocols that are secure in a practical setting. An important problem that arises is that of signal loss. Signal loss can be detrimental as it allows attackers to only answer on a subset of rounds. We investigate several questions related to the practical implementation of such protocols. We propose a new experimentally feasible protocol, which is fully loss-tolerant against attackers restricted to classical communication. Furthermore, we consider the role of allowing quantum communication with no pre-shared entanglement for attackers and show that this setting is strictly stronger than the classical one, indicating that allowing for quantum communication may break security. Conversely, we then show that any protocol secure against classical communication can be transformed into a protocol secure against quantum communication. Finally, we invert the picture, and consider the task of non-local quantum computation (NLQC), which corresponds to the operations of the attackers in a QPV protocol. We connect NLQC to the wider context of information-theoretic cryptography by relating it to a number of other cryptographic primitives.
    • File Description:
      application/pdf; image/jpeg
    • ISBN:
      978-94-6473-561-1
      94-6473-561-9
    • Relation:
      https://dare.uva.nl/personal/pure/en/publications/quantum-position-verification(99cf6f30-80bd-4bd6-b1ed-b0d1931f3a65).html; urn:ISBN:9789464735611
    • Rights:
      info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
    • الرقم المعرف:
      edsbas.BEC3736E