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Strict Liability, Capped Strict Liability, and Care Effort under Asymmetric Information

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  • معلومة اضافية
    • Contributors:
      Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion (GREDEG); Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) (UNS)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université Côte d'Azur (UniCA); SRM
    • بيانات النشر:
      HAL CCSD
      Mohr Siebeck
    • الموضوع:
      2012
    • Collection:
      HAL Université Côte d'Azur
    • نبذة مختصرة :
      24 pages ; International audience ; This paper compares the effectiveness of strict liability and capped strict liability regimes in an agency relationship among a regulatory agency and operators of risky activities. Under a double asymmetric information assumption (wealth and efficiency in care effort), it shows that capping liability is more efficient than keeping with strict liability, this at the price of an informational rent. Efficiency means that the efficient agent supplies the level of safety effort equivalent to the first best solution one. At the optimum, this rent is minimized by the efficient contract supplied by the principal.
    • Relation:
      hal-00727213; https://hal.science/hal-00727213; https://hal.science/hal-00727213/document; https://hal.science/hal-00727213/file/Risky_activities_revis_FV_feb2012.pdf
    • Rights:
      info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
    • الرقم المعرف:
      edsbas.A2574C24