Perfekcionistická kritika liberalizmu verejného rozumu: argumenty liberálnych perfekcionistov ; The perfectionist critique of public reason liberalism: the arguments of liberal perfectionists

The aim of this article is to show from the position of liberal perfectionists that the arguments of public reason liberalism about the unacceptability of perfectionist efforts and controversial positions are unconvincing. In the first part, we will examine the moral respect objection to perfectionism as was formulated by Martha Nussbaum and show that such arguments fail, after which we will introduce a more appropriate, perfectionist conception. In the second part, we will address a more practical question which illustrates well the greater plausibility of the perfectionist position. We will critique an attempt to apply the respect-based argument to perfectionist subsidies, which the leading theorist of liberalism of public reason, Jonathan Quong, has rejected as manipulative. In the third part, we move from these everyday questions of political decision-making to how liberals of public reason use respect in controversial, cultural-ethical issues. Relying on neutral political values is shown to be an unsustainable and illusory solution in the pursuit of equal respect for all. These three lines of argumentation (i.e. theoretical, practical-political and cultural-ethical) will allow us to point out that the project of public reason liberalism brings with it far more problems than its proponents will acknowledge. ; Cieľom tohto článku je ukázať z pozície liberálnych perfekcionistov, že argumenty liberalizmu verejného rozumu o neprijateľnosti perfekcionistických snáh a kontroverzných pozícií sú nepresvedčivé. V prvej časti preskúmame morálnu námietku z rešpektu voči perfekcionizmu, ako ju sformulovala Martha Nussbaumová, ukážeme, že takéto argumenty zlyhávajú, a predstavíme vhodnejšiu, perfekcionistickú koncepciu. V druhej časti prejdeme k praktickejšej otázke, ktorá dobre ilustruje väčšiu vierohodnosť perfekcionistickej pozície. Podrobíme kritike pokus aplikovať argument z rešpektu na perfekcionistické dotácie, ktoré popredný teoretik liberalizmu verejného rozumu Jonathan Quong odmietol ako manipulatívne. V tretej ...