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Mechanized Proofs of Adversarial Complexity and Application to Universal Composability ; Mechanized Proofs of Adversarial Complexity and Application to Universal Composability: Journal pre-print: full version

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  • معلومة اضافية
    • Contributors:
      Faculdade de Ciências da Universidade do Porto (FCUP); Universidade do Porto = University of Porto; CRACS & Inesc TEC Porto; Institute IMDEA Software Madrid; Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy Bochum (MPI Security and Privacy); Sûreté du logiciel et Preuves Mathématiques Formalisées (STAMP); Inria Sophia Antipolis - Méditerranée (CRISAM); Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria); Programming securely with cryptography (PROSECCO); Inria de Paris; Meta; ANR-17-CE39-0004,TECAP,Analyse de protocoles - unir les outils existants(2017); ANR-22-PECY-0006,SVP,Verification of Security Protocols(2022)
    • بيانات النشر:
      HAL CCSD
      ACM
    • الموضوع:
      2023
    • Collection:
      HAL Université Côte d'Azur
    • نبذة مختصرة :
      Journal pre-print: full version ; International audience ; In this paper we enhance the EasyCrypt proof assistant to reason about computational complexity of ad-versaries. The key technical tool is a Hoare logic for reasoning about computational complexity (executiontime and oracle calls) of adversarial computations. Our Hoare logic is built on top of the module system used by EasyCrypt for modeling adversaries. We prove that our logic is sound w.r.t. the semantics of EasyCrypt programs — we also provide full semantics for the EasyCrypt module system, which was previously lacking. We showcase (for the first time in EasyCrypt and in other computer-aided cryptographic tools) how ourapproach can express precise relationships between the probability of adversarial success and their execution time. In particular, we can quantify existentially over adversaries in a complexity class, and express general composition statements in simulation-based frameworks. Moreover, such statements can be composed to derive standard concrete security bounds for cryptographic constructions whose security is proved in a modular way. As a main benefit of our approach, we revisit security proofs of some well-known cryptographic constructions and we present a new formalization of Universal Composability (UC).
    • Relation:
      hal-04048217; https://inria.hal.science/hal-04048217; https://inria.hal.science/hal-04048217/document; https://inria.hal.science/hal-04048217/file/hal-preprint.pdf
    • الرقم المعرف:
      10.1145/3589962
    • Rights:
      http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ ; info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
    • الرقم المعرف:
      edsbas.60F13B02