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Working in family firms: less paid but more secure? Evidence from French matched employer-employee data

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  • معلومة اضافية
    • Contributors:
      Equipe de recherche sur les marches, l'emploi et la simulation (ERMES); Université Panthéon-Assas (UP2)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA); IZA; Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Economiques = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OCDE); Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PSE); École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL); Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Paris School of Economics (PSE); Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL); Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-Université Paris Sciences et Lettres (PSL)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE); EconomiX (EconomiX); Université Paris Nanterre (UPN)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
    • بيانات النشر:
      HAL CCSD
    • الموضوع:
      2010
    • نبذة مختصرة :
      We study the compensation package offered by family firms. Using matched employer-employee data for a sample of French establishments in the 2000s, we first show that family firms pay on average lower wages to their workers. This family/non-family wage gap is robust to controlling for several establishment and individual characteristics and does not appear to be due either to the differential of productivity between family and non-family firms or to unobserved establishment and individual heterogeneity. Moreover, it is relatively homogeneous across workers with different gender, educational attainment and age. By contrast, the family/non-family wage gap is found to be larger for clerks and blue-collar workers than for managers, supervisors and technicians, for whom we find no significant wage gap. As a second step, we investigate why workers stay in family firms while being paid less. We show that these firms offer greater job security. We find evidence that the rate of dismissal is lower in family than in non-family firms. We also show that family firms rely less on dismissals and more on hiring reductions when they downsize. These results are confirmed by subjective data: the perceived risk of dismissal is significantly lower in family firms than in non-family ones. We speculate that our results can be explained either by a compensating wage differential story or by a model in which workers sort in different firms according to their preferences. ; Nous étudions les systèmes de rémunérations en vigueur dans les entreprises familiales. Sur la base de données employeurs-salariés appariées portant sur un échantillon d'établissements français dans les années 2000, nous montrons dans un premier temps que les entreprises familiales versent des salaires plus faibles que les entreprises non familiales. Cet écart de salaires est robuste à l'introduction d'une série de contrôles portant sur les caractéristiques des établissements et des salariés. De plus, il n'apparaît pas dû à l'écart de productivité existant entre ...
    • Relation:
      halshs-00564972; https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00564972; https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00564972/document; https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00564972/file/wp201040.pdf
    • الدخول الالكتروني :
      https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00564972
      https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00564972/document
      https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00564972/file/wp201040.pdf
    • Rights:
      info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
    • الرقم المعرف:
      edsbas.43E3B970