An Analysis of a Reciprocal Theory of Rights: Examining how rights can be forfeited and to whom rights can be allocated

This thesis is an examination of the theory of reciprocity as forwarded by David Rodin. His theory is a reply to Cécile Fabre’s arguments for a subsistence war. In particular, he criticises the interest theory of rights. I will present his theory and analyse it using cases to showcase my intuitions because his theory is worth examining independently. It is particularly interesting for human rights because it can offer an alternate explanation for rights justification and accounts for rights forfeiture. I will focus on these two aspects of his theory. The first aspect is his account of rights forfeiture and its implications in example cases in which I argue lie three problems. Firstly, it is difficult pinpoint when the conditions for possession of a right are lost. Secondly, whether innocent threats forfeit their right by virtue of being a threat even if it was faultless and unintentional. Thirdly, the grounds for a duty may be lost when a right is forfeited which is counter-intuitive. The second aspect is how he allows the comatose to possess rights through the use of counterfactuals. I shall examine whether infants and animals can also possess rights to assistance if the comatose can. Through my analysis I find six requirements to be able to possess rights through reciprocity. My assessment finds that the reciprocity theory offers an explanation to rights that is intuitive for interpersonal relationships and can allow a variety of agents to come to possess rights against harm and rights to assistance.