The Role of Embodiment in Conceptual Understanding

Jedno je od središnjih pitanja kognitivne znanosti kako su pojmovi reprezentirani u ljudskome umu. Klasični je odgovor na to pitanje pretpostavka o odvojenome semantičkome modulu u kojemu je znanje pohranjeno putem apstraktnih simboličkih reprezentacija. Tako opisan semantički modul odvojen je od drugih sustava kao što su moduli za percepciju i motoriku. U posljednjih dvadesetak godina intenzivno se istražuje i razvija alternativni pristup poznat pod nazivom utjelovljena ili utemeljena spoznaja koji polazi od pretpostavke da je pojmovno znanje u stalnoj interakciji s percepcijom i motorikom, odnosno da je ukorijenjeno u njima putem mehanizma perceptivne simulacije. Cilj je ovoga rada dati pregled različitih teorijskih perspektiva na utjelovljenu spoznaju i evaluirati ih. Detaljno su prikazane teorija sustava perceptivnih simbola, model prožetoga iskustvenika i indeksna hipoteza te empirijski nalazi koji im idu ili ne idu u prilog. Zatim su prikazane i kritike utjelovljene spoznaje koje se odnose na razumijevanje apstraktnih pojmova, kao i odgovori na te kritike. Razmotrena je i ideja o stupnjevima ili kontinuumu utjelovljenja. Nakraju su dane smjernice za daljnja istraživanja koja bi trebala rasvijetliti točnu ulogu utjelovljenja u reprezentaciji znanja.
One of the central questions in cognitive science is to understand how conceptual knowledge is represented in the human mind. The classical answer to this question is the assumption of a separate semantic module in which knowledge is stored through abstract symbolic representations. The semantic module is separate from other systems, such as modules for perception and action. In the last twenty years, an alternative approach, known as embodied or grounded cognition, has been developed and intensively studied, starting from the assumption that conceptual knowledge is in constant interaction with perception and action, and that conceptual knowledge is grounded in them through the mechanism of perceptual simulation. The aim of this paper is to review different theoretical perspectives on embodied cognition and to evaluate them. The theory of perceptual symbol systems, the model of the immersed experiencer and the indexical hypothesis are presented in detail, as well as empirical findings that support or refute these models. Then, critiques of embodied cognition related to the understanding of abstract concepts are presented, as well as responses to these critiques. The idea of degrees or continuum of embodiment is also considered. Finally, directions for future research are outlined, to try to shed light on the question of what exactly is the role of embodiment in the representation of knowledge.