Corte al Congreso: Poder judicial y trámite legislativo en Colombia

Latin American Research Review, Vol 56, Iss 3 (2021)
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Repositorio EdocUR-U. Rosario
Universidad del Rosario
instacron:Universidad del Rosario

Cultural Studies; History; Multidisciplinary; Sociology and Political Science; Literature and Literary Theory; Public policy; Prácticas de obstrucción; Ciencia política; General Arts and Humanities; Geography, Planning and Development; Proceso legislativo; Obstruction practices; Social Sciences; Development; F1201-3799; Anthropology; Constitutional Court; Political Science and International Relations; Políticas públicas; Legislative process; Corte Constitucional; Latin America. Spanish America; General Economics, Econometrics and Finance

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