Self-Selection and the Redistributive Impact of In-Kind Transfers An Econometric Analysis.

Self-targeting welfare programs have received increasing attention from economists and policymakers alike. This paper provides evidence on the redistributive impact of transferring low-quality goods in-kind. I study a school feeding program in Jamaica, which distributes a bland snack to all students. Poorer households and those with a greater number of eligible children are found significantly more likely to self-select into the program. But, against these targeting benefits is a large estimated dead-weight loss. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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