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SENIORITY AND DISTRIBUTION IN A TWO-WORKER TRADE UNION.

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  • المؤلفون: Kuhn, Peter; Robert, Jacques
  • المصدر:
    Quarterly Journal of Economics. Aug89, Vol. 104 Issue 3, p485-505. 21p.
  • معلومة اضافية
    • الموضوع:
    • نبذة مختصرة :
      Unlike existing models that rely heavily on assumptions regarding unions' distributional preferences, we present a simple model in which union seniority-layoff rules and rising seniority-wage profiles result from optimal price discrimination against the firm. Surprisingly, even when cash transfers among union members are ruled out, unions' optimal seniority-wage profiles are likely to be completely unaffected by their distributional preferences because of a kink in the utility-possibility frontier. This suggests that the simple technology of price discrimination may play a key role, hitherto unappreciated, in explaining union policies that affect the relative well-being of different union members. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
    • نبذة مختصرة :
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