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Profit distribution and managers' behaviour in vertical integrated medical delivery systems - an experimental economics study.

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  • المؤلفون: Bo Y;Bo Y;Bo Y; Qi M; Qi M; Liu S; Liu S; Cui J; Cui J; Han Y; Han Y
  • المصدر:
    BMC health services research [BMC Health Serv Res] 2020 Jul 02; Vol. 20 (1), pp. 611. Date of Electronic Publication: 2020 Jul 02.
  • نوع النشر :
    Journal Article
  • اللغة:
    English
  • معلومة اضافية
    • المصدر:
      Publisher: BioMed Central Country of Publication: England NLM ID: 101088677 Publication Model: Electronic Cited Medium: Internet ISSN: 1472-6963 (Electronic) Linking ISSN: 14726963 NLM ISO Abbreviation: BMC Health Serv Res Subsets: MEDLINE
    • بيانات النشر:
      Original Publication: London : BioMed Central, [2001-
    • الموضوع:
      Delivery of Health Care, Integrated/*economics ; Delivery of Health Care, Integrated/*organization & administration ; Hospital Administrators/*psychology; China ; Humans
    • نبذة مختصرة :
      Background: The vertical integration of medical delivery systems (VIMDSs) is a reform direction both in China and worldwide. We conducted a controlled economic experiment to explore decision-making by managers of medical institutions with respect to profits and what influences the distribution mechanism in VIMDSs.
      Methods: Students and hospital staff were recruited to make choices regarding the role of directors of institutions. z-Tree software was used to design the experimental program. Ninety-six subjects participated in the experiment. We gathered 479 valid contracts.
      Results: Of the subjects, 66.39% chose flexible contracts. The median of the bidding distribution rate to community health service centres of all auctions was 18.50%. The final distribution rate was approximately 3 percentage points higher than the bidding distribution rate. The median effort level was 9.00. There was a significant correlation between the improvement rate and the choice of effort level (P<0.05) in flexible contracts.
      Conclusions: Hospital managers have a preference for flexible contracts because of uncertainty in the medical system. A community health service centre director may behave perfunctorily by engaging in shading in the integration. Flexible contracts and sharing rates beyond the participants' expectations motivate managers to engage in more cooperative behaviours.
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    • Grant Information:
      71403177 National Natural Science Foundation of China
    • Contributed Indexing:
      Keywords: Experimental economics; Manager behaviour; Medical delivery system; Profit distribution; Vertical integration
    • الموضوع:
      Date Created: 20200704 Date Completed: 20201218 Latest Revision: 20201218
    • الموضوع:
      20240628
    • الرقم المعرف:
      PMC7331245
    • الرقم المعرف:
      10.1186/s12913-020-05467-0
    • الرقم المعرف:
      32616035