Filosofía y ciencia: críticas al uso que hace Bergson del argumento de Boltzmann contra la reversibilidad del universo. (Spanish)

Philosophy and science: critique of Bergson's use of Boltzmann's argument against the reversibility of the universe. (English)

This paper seeks to understand the relationships and exchanges between philosophy and science by analysing a specific case: Bergson's use of Boltzmann's argument against the reversibility or recurrence of the universe ("Zermelo's paradox"). This argument is used by Bergson to indirectly support his conception of the irreversibility of the universe based on an élan vital. We criticize Bergson's interpretation that turns into an "absolute impossibility" what Boltzmann states only as a "practical impossibility". We will show that the French philosopher distorts the argument, leaving aside two fundamental points: a) Boltzmann's particular epistemological position with respect to scientific theories and their relation to experience, b) the atomism that serves as the basis for Boltzmann's argument, an atomism that Bergson rejects. We conclude that Boltzmann's argument is not valid in Bergson's metaphysical (epistemological and ontological) framework. We hope this paper contributes to a better understanding of the problems arising in the conceptual exchanges between science and philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Este artículo busca comprender las relaciones e intercambios entre filosofía y ciencia, analizando un caso concreto: el uso que hace Bergson del argumento de Boltzmann contra la reversibilidad o recurrencia del universo ("paradoja de Zermelo"), apoyando indirectamente su concepción de la irreversibilidad del universo asentada en un élan vital. Criticamos que Bergson, en su interpretación, convierta en "imposibilidad absoluta" lo que Boltzmann asienta sólo como "imposibilidad práctica". Mostraremos que el filósofo francés distorsiona el argumento, dejando de lado dos puntos fundamentales: a) la particular posición epistemológica de Boltzmann respecto a las teorías científicas y su relación con la experiencia, b) el atomismo que sirve de base al argumento de Boltzmann, atomismo que Bergson rechaza. Concluiremos que el argumento de Boltzmann no es válido en el marco metafísico (epistemológico y ontológico) de Bergson. Esto contribuirá a una mejor comprensión de los problemas que surgen en los intercambios conceptuales entre ciencia y filosofía. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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