THE EXCISE TAX ON HIGH-COSTHEALTH PLANS: POTENTIAL ADJUSTMENTS BY POLICYMAKERS, EMPLOYERS, AND EMPLOYEES.

EXCISE tax; MEDICAL care; EMPLOYERS; EMPLOYEES; INTERNAL revenue

This paper examines the Affordable Care Act's (ACA's) excise tax on high-cost health plans and simulates how tax threshold adjustments and potential behavioral responses by employers and enrollees may affect the prevalence of the tax. Our results show that threshold adjustments that account for high premiums for reasons other than the generosity of benefits, such as adjustments for the age/sex composition of the workforce and geographic variation in health care costs, make a difference in the simulated prevalence of the excise tax and may help target the tax more precisely at plans at the high end of the distribution of health benefits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of National Tax Journal is the property of University of Chicago Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)