Nudging the public sphere: a Habermasian perspective on public deliberation as an aim of moral education.

MORAL attitudes; PUBLIC sphere; MORAL education; CIVICS; DISCOURSE ethics

This article offers an account of the understanding citizens need in order to justify moral principles in the public sphere and it identifies an important role for moral education in the promotion of that civic understanding. I develop this account through a contrastive analysis of Phillip Kitcher’s conception of public knowledge and Jurgen Habermas’ Discourse Ethics. Kitcher is focused on the social conditions necessary for the circulation of scientific knowledge in advanced democracies; the analysis offered in this article expands on what Habermas and other deliberative democrats claim are epistemic conditions necessary for the construction and circulation of moral understanding. I use this account to critically assess public policy that aims to ‘get around’ public deliberation by using strategies derived from behavioral economics in order to shift civic behavior in specific (moral) directions. Finally, I specify how such strategies have the potential to undermine moral understanding in the public sphere and I argue for a central role for moral education in mitigating such effects. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Copyright of Journal of Moral Education is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)