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Perfekcionistická kritika liberalizmu verejného rozumu : Argumenty liberálnych perfekcionistov

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  • معلومة اضافية
    • بيانات النشر:
      Filosofický ústav AV ČR
    • الموضوع:
      2023
    • Collection:
      Masaryk University: Open Services of Information System / Masarykova univerzita: Veřejné služby Informačního systému
    • نبذة مختصرة :
      The aim of this article is to show from the position of liberal perfectionists that the arguments of public reason liberalism about the unacceptability of perfectionist efforts and controversial positions are unconvincing. In the first part, we will examine the moral respect objection to perfectionism as was formulated by Martha Nussbaum and show that such arguments fail, after which we will introduce a more appropriate, perfectionist conception. In the second part, we will address a more practical question which illustrates well the greater plausibility of the perfectionist position. We will critique an attempt to apply the respect-based argument to perfectionist subsidies, which the leading theorist of liberalism of public reason, Jonathan Quong, has rejected as manipulative. In the third part, we move from these everyday questions of political decision-making to how liberals of public reason use respect in controversial, cultural-ethical issues. Relying on neutral political values is shown to be an unsustainable and illusory solution in the pursuit of equal respect for all. These three lines of argumentation (i.e. theoretical, practical-political and cultural-ethical) will allow us to point out that the project of public reason liberalism brings with it far more problems than its proponents will acknowledge. ; The aim of this article is to show from the position of liberal perfectionists that the arguments of public reason liberalism about the unacceptability of perfectionist efforts and controversial positions are unconvincing. In the first part, we will examine the moral respect objection to perfectionism as was formulated by Martha Nussbaum and show that such arguments fail, after which we will introduce a more appropriate, perfectionist conception. In the second part, we will address a more practical question which illustrates well the greater plausibility of the perfectionist position. We will critique an attempt to apply the respect-based argument to perfectionist subsidies, which the leading theorist ...
    • Relation:
      https://is.muni.cz/publication/2332564
    • الرقم المعرف:
      10.46854/fc.2023.3r.489
    • الدخول الالكتروني :
      https://is.muni.cz/publication/2332564
      https://doi.org/10.46854/fc.2023.3r.489
    • Rights:
      info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
    • الرقم المعرف:
      edsbas.6F6AEB65